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# 1

## Confusing Shakespeare's Characters with Real People: Reflections on Reading in Four Questions

*Michael Bristol*

Whenever I teach a Shakespeare play, or discuss one with a friend, or attend a performance, I find myself relating to the characters just as I do with real people. I don't think I'm really confused. Dr Johnson didn't think so either: "[S]pectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first act to the last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the players are only players."<sup>1</sup> Fair enough, but why do I puzzle over Macbeth's real motives or speculate about Lady Macbeth's children? And why do I think that the basic intuitions I use to understand my friends and relatives are appropriate tools for getting at a fictional character? This essay is about some of my assumptions about notions like human nature, the self, individuality, and how these categories have been articulated by Shakespeare in his characters. It is not really a theory about fictional characters. For that, it's best to consult Trevor Ponech's essay in this volume.<sup>2</sup> Rather, this essay is more concerned with articulating what I think I've learned about the way Shakespeare characterizes his make-believe people.

### **Why is it possible to ride a bicycle?**

On the face of it, it's not really obvious that it can be done at all. Picture a silent movie with Buster Keaton. He sets up a bike on its wheels, hitches up his pants, and in that tiny interval the bike falls over. No matter how carefully he tries to position the bike, it will fall over every time. But after a while he gives it a push. It stays up for a while, then falls over, but something has been learned: stationary wheels fall over; spinning ones stay balanced. This is the physical principle of the gyroscope, used for guidance systems in spacecraft, but the basic idea is known to any child who has ever spun a top.



Back in our silent movie, Buster Keaton has managed to make the bike stay up in a shaky sort of way, but he's not really riding yet. Once he has confidence that there's a way to keep the bike from just falling over, he tries out the idea of getting on and then giving it a good push-off to keep it moving. Soon he can even ride with no hands! How did he learn so fast? This is possible because the organs of balance can regulate the bike's momentum as the rider pedals along his chosen path. The principle of the gyroscope, average balance, and reasonably well functioning arms and legs constitute the conditions of possibility for bike riding. And anyone can do it. The *possibility* of riding a bicycle is independent of its historical context; it's part of human nature, like speaking a language or solving problems by trial and error.

The ability to ride a bicycle is, we might say, a latent potentiality of all human beings. The actual riding of bicycles is another matter. For someone living in Ancient Egypt, bicycle riding would not just have been impossible, it would have been inconceivable. For actual bicycle riding to be possible, there have to be bicycles and places to ride them; or, in other words, historically specific social conditions and technical discoveries that actualize any potentiality of human nature. Understanding these conditions is the task of historical inquiry, which is concerned with "bringing out, as vividly as possible, the peculiar and transient idiosyncrasy of the individual or social group under study."<sup>3</sup> People living in Ancient Egypt or in Early Modern England must undoubtedly be shaped by all kinds of contingent states of affairs. Still, the underlying point of historical inquiry must be that there are underlying regularities that make historically specific differences intelligible within our own similarly peculiar and transient conditions of life.

Human nature has become a problematic idea for most of the people now writing criticism of Shakespeare. This is partly due to the extraordinary success of historical inquiry in bringing out specific complexities in Shakespeare's works. Feelings, attitudes, ways of relating to other people, the very idea of "self," all look very different in Shakespeare's culture from what we are used to in our everyday lives.<sup>4</sup> Even something as "natural" as bodily experience is culturally constructed to a surprising degree, as Gail Kern Paster has shown.<sup>5</sup> In addition, specific claims about human nature often exhibit a degree of ideological blindness that confuses our "peculiar and transient idiosyncrasy" with universal characteristics of all human beings.<sup>6</sup> Jonathan Dollimore's sustained critique of "essentialist humanism" is perhaps the most thorough and persuasive account of this view for early modern literary studies. Dollimore is certainly right to take on the intellectual complacency often on display

in claims people have made about human nature. But it does not follow from his critique that there can be no “essential” features of human experience that register across different cultural and historical settings. “Claims regarding cultural constructs cannot simply be assumed as a priori truths blocking interpretive inquiries that may give us cause to reject them.”<sup>7</sup>

I think it’s desirable to think about a general human nature if only in the sense of exploring areas of convergence as well as areas of difference, and indeed to distinguish between the two. Noam Chomsky has argued for a latent potentiality for learning language as both innate and central to a shared human nature.<sup>8</sup> An acquaintance of mine who teaches Mathematics is convinced that human beings in all cultures are in some way attuned to the Pythagorean harmonic proportions expressed in musical intervals.<sup>9</sup> We can certainly say that there is a “history of sex” but let’s not forget that there is also “a biology of sex.”<sup>10</sup> The relationship between “history” and “biology” is what Sandra Harding has called an “organic social variable.”<sup>11</sup> Her idea is that a number of features of our common evolutionary development, notably human reproductive physiology, demand a specific articulation in every cultural setting. This is very different from the approach taken in socio-biology, which usually gets into trouble by trying to do too much.<sup>12</sup> Harding’s identification of the sex-gender system as an organic social variable combines a sensible acknowledgement that some things are invariant in every social context with an awareness of cultural diversity. Martha Nussbaum tries to take this idea much farther, suggesting that all human cultures recognize such things as friendship and affiliation, skills for problem solving, humor, sexuality, infant and child development, among other things.<sup>13</sup>

For Shakespeare, the idea of human nature appears tragically in the image of unaccommodated man, the “poor bare forked animal” (3.4.99–100)<sup>14</sup> that remains when false and dissembling garments are stripped away. The notion of “unaccommodated man” (99) clearly speaks to a general “human condition” of radical physical vulnerability. It means, literally, a man without any commodities, without the barest minimum of social amenities or even basic needs. Lear wonders if a man is “no more than this,” (95–96), but what he has evidently seen is that a person is certainly no less than this. *King Lear* is a play that gives us a lot to think about, but one thing seems consistent and unambiguous. No social position or moral attitude confers immunity to loss and suffering. Human fragility, “the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to,” rather than any latent potentiality like bicycle riding, is the common and natural condition of human personhood.

For Shakespeare, this sense of human nature as vulnerability to harm makes a powerful claim on our attention as moral imperative rather than as sociobiological explanation. This claim finds its most startling, difficult, and disturbing articulation in the words of a character fundamentally alien and inimical to the ethos of the community in which he resides. Shylock hopes to be permitted to live his life as a Jew in Venetian society, a desire protected by the laws of the Republic of Venice, but not, apparently, by many of its citizens.<sup>15</sup> Antonio never denies spitting upon him, and his friends Salario and Salarino continue to taunt him when his daughter absconds with his money. Just in case we in the audience are tempted to join in the fun, however, Shylock confronts his tormentors with a question: does the fact of being Jewish provide any reason or give permission to insult, harm, and humiliate someone?

*Shylock:* Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, heal'd by the same means, warm'd and cool'd by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why, revenge. The villainy you teach me, I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction.

*(The Merchant of Venice 3.1.49–61)*

Shylock's resistance to the jeering disrespect of his Christian neighbors is based on an appeal to human nature. This idea includes, but is not limited to, the shared physiological condition of organic function and vulnerability. There is also a psychological element here—"if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?"

For Shylock, the Christian privilege conferred by the doctrine of "turning the other cheek" will always express itself in accordance with a human nature that seeks retribution for every injury. This speaks very specifically to the historical antagonism between Christian and Jew; it also speaks to the question of Shylock's Jewish identity as sufficient warrant for the hatred displayed towards him.<sup>16</sup> What are we to make of this remarkable intervention in what is otherwise a comic tale about overcoming obstacles to a series of happy marriages? Salario and Salarino

basically have nothing to say; they're interrupted—they have to go and see Antonio. Charles Spinosa has shown that the dispute between Shylock and Antonio recapitulates certain fundamental changes in the understanding of the law of contract in Early Modern England.<sup>17</sup> For Henry Turner, the play is concerned with changing ideas about friendship, affiliation, and citizenship.<sup>18</sup> Edward Andrew sees in this speech a powerful articulation of a theory of human rights, based on a robust picture of a common physical and psychological nature.<sup>19</sup>

I very much admire the intelligence in these examples of historical inquiry, but they all tend to diminish what Harry Berger calls the “fatness of the character.”<sup>20</sup> Berger’s intuition is that the language of a Shakespeare character—like the Duke in *Measure for Measure*; or like Shylock—is not well elucidated as the expression of a generic or historical type. For Berger, an utterance always presupposes an actual person. Following Berger, I wonder if there is something even more basic and also more personal in Shylock’s speech. “Hath not a Jew eyes?” What does this Jew see with his own eyes? He sees other people who hate him *because he is a Jew*. And so Shylock hates: “Hatred, it seems, cannot be bought . . . no amount of money will buy Shylock.”<sup>21</sup> This is specifically Shylock’s nature, but it is not his human nature. In the world of *The Merchant of Venice*, hatred is what we necessarily are to expect. Human nature as it is articulated by Shylock is not so much about having human organs, or desires, or attitudes. It is basically a kind of moral entitlement, a “right” to be recognized and respected as a human being.<sup>22</sup> It’s an odd thing for Shylock to be saying, but then who else would there be to say it?

## How does a small child build a tower of wooden blocks?

The answer to this question has something in common with the possibility of riding a bicycle. The task involved has to be possible. So things don’t fall through the floor; towers can be made of blocks, but not sour cream. The task involves learning, discovery, and problem solving. And it is a potential that exists in all children, independent of their historical context. But this is not a question about why something is possible, it is rather about how something is done. Unlike the case of bicycle riding, the answer seems obvious: put one block on top of another; what’s the problem? Marvin Minsky points out that “An idea will seem self-evident—once you’ve forgotten learning it.”<sup>23</sup> This is what he calls “the amnesia of infancy: . . . though all grown-up persons know how to do such things, *no one understands how we learn to do them.*”<sup>24</sup>

It turns out that building a tower of blocks is a complex achievement. Minsky describes the child's mind as a kind of "society" consisting of "mental agents," each one capable of accomplishing a specialized function.<sup>25</sup> "Builder" is one of these agents, whose specialization is constructing towers. To do this, however, builder acts only as a general contractor, drawing on the skills of other agents known as "begin", "add", and "end." Begin decides where to put the tower and End decides when it is high enough. Add has the job of placing blocks, but to do this she has to recruit agents called "find", "get", and "put" who in turn depend on "see", "grasp", "move", "release", and so on. It's no wonder that small children find playing with blocks so fascinating. Some of them eventually grow up to be stone-masons, contractors, or architects. Most of us do other things when we grow up, but the agents that enable us to build towers are still there, even if we can't remember where they came from.

The amnesia of infancy refers not only to things we had to learn, but also to things that weren't learned at all. "Prior to the greater part of specific cultural shaping, though perhaps not free from all shaping, are certain areas of human experience and development that are broadly shared . . . all humans begin as hungry babies, perceiving their own helplessness . . ." <sup>26</sup> Clearly, many of the "mental agents" we need for the basic activity of everyday life look like standard equipment—impersonal logical routines for picking up a cup of coffee that aren't distinguishing traits of anyone in particular but form part of a more general human nature. Such logical routines might include mental agents like builder, wrecker, bicycle rider, and so on, according to an inventory of stock human functions. Not everyone gets exactly the same standard package of skills. It is said that there are men who cannot boil an egg. But if people are inhabited by whole societies of distinct agents, what does it mean to speak of a self?

Descartes famously thought there was some kind of co-ordinating agency that thought and therefore was. He called this magisterial agent "reason" and considered it as sovereign.<sup>27</sup> This picture of the self, often characterized as the "ghost in the machine," conforms to our common sense intuition about ourselves, but it doesn't withstand much close scrutiny.<sup>28</sup> The idea of a centralized self somehow regulating all our diverse and conflicted mental agents has been rejected as an illusion by many different modes of inquiry, including historical research about early modern drama.<sup>29</sup> The most brilliant critique of the Cartesian "ego" that I have encountered was in a skit performed many years ago by Sid Caesar as "the brain." Seated in front of a bank of phones, he received

messages from “the knee”, “the eyes” and “the ears”, and tried to issue instructions to the various organs. The inputs were so fast and furious that all efforts at co-ordination very quickly broke down.

But if there is no one in charge, how do our minds function? For Nietzsche “reason” is neither unified nor the dominant cause of action:

The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of “cells” in which dominion resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and understanding how to command?<sup>30</sup>

The important point here is the idea of equals used to ruling jointly, as in the well ordered *polis* described by Aristotle. Nietzsche’s idea is more traditional than it sounds, since the “mental aristocrats” presumably have common interests and mutual respect for each other. But Nietzsche’s idea of a society of aristocrats “used to ruling jointly” itself now seems a bit idealistic. The society of mind looks more like a bunch of disorganized street people dressed in “borrowed robes,” a kind of shabby vaudeville with unreliable and inept management. Minsky’s reference to “the amnesia of infancy” is interesting in this respect, since it reminds us that the “mental agents” we rely on so much are not even indigenous, but come from outside ourselves as part of a diaspora of hand-me-down selves in the form of an anonymous repertoire of gestures, attitudes, and personality traits.

Is there really a “core of interiority” where a unified and coherent self can be found? Sid Caesar as “the brain” just had way too much to do, and his performance would suggest that the idea of a central self just can’t be made to work. But if the “single self” view is unworkable, what about the “plural self” picture of things? Minsky thinks we’re never fully satisfied with either of these alternatives; that we need to recognize both interpretations to represent our own *rapport a soi*. Self, on his account, corresponds to a conservative function, some process that maintains a relatively stable continuity in our lives. A well functioning self, even if we don’t know where it is or how it works, makes it possible to have plans and purposes, instead of trying to do everything at once.<sup>31</sup> Keeping track of self and its purposes is not about unity so much as it is about coherence. Maintaining coherence is a more complex task than putting one block on top of another. Stuff happens. The world presents us with distractions, crises, and complicated problems to solve.

Rosalind is a beautiful young princess whose father has been banished by her not-very-nice uncle. She falls in love with a beautiful young man called Orlando. Her uncle sends her into exile. She gets disguised as a boy because she is “uncommon tall” and goes to the forest of Arden. She pretends to be Ganymede. She meets the beautiful boy. She pretends to be Rosalind and helps Orlando woo her. Her goal is to marry Orlando. But Rosalind’s over-riding purpose is to survive, to keep on being Rosalind, which isn’t easy because she also has to keep on being Ganymede. And, of course, Ganymede has troubles of his own, one of which is called Phoebe.

Pretending to be myself at the same time as I’m pretending to be somebody else is a conventional device in literature, but it’s probably most familiar to most of us as something we do every day.<sup>32</sup> Shakespeare is quite interested in situations like this one, and not just in his comedies. Viola’s disguise as Cesario is one kind of analogue, Hamlet’s “antic disposition” is another. The survival involved in these situations is really a kind of ethical self-preservation, maintaining integrity by a strategic practice of disintegrity. Versatility, change, dissimulation are all placed at the service of the conservative self. Rosalind wants to be sure that Orlando really loves her, and so she asks him how long he would “have her.” He tells her “forever and a day.” But this is the wrong answer. She doesn’t want a conventional response; she wants a reality check.

*Rosalind:* Say “a day” without the “ever.” No, no Orlando, men are April when they woo, December when they wed; maids are May when they are maids, but the sky changes when they are wives. I will be more jealous of thee than a Barbary cock-pigeon over his hen, more clamorous than a parrot against rain, more new-fangled than an ape, more giddy in my desires than a monkey. I will weep for nothing, like Diana in the fountain, and I will do that when you are dispos’d to be merry. I will laugh like a hyen, and that when thou art inclin’d to sleep.

(*As You Like It* 4.1.124–33)

What Rosalind wants Orlando to understand is that when you marry someone you don’t get a fairy tale; what you get is a person with a mind. In Rosalind’s case, her mind is not just a diverse society of mental agents; it’s a veritable zoo of emotions, impulses, and perversities.

Rosalind doesn’t want to be loved forever and a day. She wants Orlando to love her even when she’s acting like a hyena, whether he is sleepy or depressed or in a good mood. This is what “marriage” means in *As You Like It*; it’s a way to augment the faculty of self-conservation

by means of another's recognition of a real person within an entire menagerie of conflicting dispositions. "Forever and a day" expresses the conventional view of marriage as an institution for maintaining an established order. Rosalind wants to take things one day at a time, hoping she won't have to impersonate herself all the time.<sup>33</sup>

We don't remember learning how to build a tower of blocks and we don't remember learning language either. These are things that Mikhail Bakhtin refers to as "exotopy"—things that come from outside the self that are necessary for its completion.<sup>34</sup> There may be no core of interiority in the early modern subject, or in anyone else for that matter, but "self" is probably better understood as "authority" rather than as "inwardness." For Rosalind, language is a performance, a way to avoid danger and to get what she wants. She wants Orlando to quit writing bad sonnets and say something simple, from the heart. Her authority is not so much about performing as it is about her capacity to utter the performative.<sup>35</sup> "I do take thee, Orlando, for my husband. There's a girl goes before the priest, and certainly a woman's thought runs before her actions" (4.1.117–19). Rosalind understands how to use language to execute her own thoughts and turn them into actions. That's why the character is so much fun to perform.

### If I am not for myself, then who will be for me?

Hillel's aphorism is not just about sticking up for oneself, though that is certainly part of what he intends.<sup>36</sup> "Hath not a Jew eyes?"—draws some of its force from this aspect of Hillel's teaching. "I" here has the sense of a core self, though "inwardness" is probably not the best way to think about the meaning of Hillel's first-person singular. What's intended here is better represented in the wanderings of Abraham: "Now the LORD had said unto Abram, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will shew thee" (Genesis 12:1) This verse implies a self that exists independently of one's situatedness in a nation or family. Its physical location is not what matters. Abraham, I was always told, wouldn't accept conventional wisdom; he thought things through for himself. This led to his *démarche* and his encounter with "I am". Hillel's aphorism speaks to a "responsible self," something other than the social roles, conventions, and habits acquired from others. This is a self that exists without any alibis.

"If I am not for myself, then who will be for me?" is sticking up for oneself but also taking responsibility for oneself. Hillel's second question—"But if I am only for myself, who am I?"<sup>37</sup> suggests an

expanded sense of what responsibility means.<sup>38</sup> There is a story that one day a pagan came to see Hillel and said that he would convert to Judaism if the Rabbi could recite the whole of the Torah while standing on one foot.<sup>39</sup> "Do not do unto others as you would not have done unto you. That is the whole of the Torah: now go and learn it." Jesus' golden rule enjoins you to do unto others as you would have others do unto you. This makes no sense unless the second-person singular addressee (you) is a first-person singular (I) that "you" are an "I" with a strong sense of self-worth and personal dignity. If my own *rappont a soi* is based on respect, consideration, and recognition for myself, I am empowered to adopt such dispositions towards others. If I live as a slave, always at the call of another's well-being, "I" have nothing to offer.

Hillel's question bears on Aristotle's discussion of the virtue of friendship. Aristotle wonders if *philautia* (self-love) is justifiable for the virtuous man. He distinguishes between a bad kind of self-love that translates as something like self-indulgence and something altogether different that looks more like a responsible self-care. ". . . It is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then he will both be benefiting himself by performing fine actions, and also help others . . . For intelligence always chooses what is best for itself, and the good man obeys the guidance of intelligence."<sup>40</sup> This has something in common with Nietzsche's master morality, his idea that ". . . the noble man lives for himself in trust and openness . . .".<sup>41</sup> For Nietzsche, this is the only possible way to treat others—even enemies—with genuine respect.

"If I am not for myself" is not only about the possibility of an ethics, however. There is a tragic sense to Hillel's aphorism. It means that no one else can be expected to act on my behalf. Personhood, the responsible self, is singularity and aloneness. What is there to say about this solitude other than taking note of suffering and death, the common fate of "unaccommodated man." Emmanuel Levinas wants to say something more about solitude than simply describing it as unhappiness. "Solitude is not tragic because it is the privation of the other, but because it is shut up within the captivity of its identity, because it is matter."<sup>42</sup> The singular self, the individual, is hard to find not because it is hidden away "deep inside" but because its existence presupposes diaspora, banishment, or possibly shipwreck.

Viola has left her country, her kindred, and her father's house. She didn't actually decide to do this; the shipwreck leaves her a stranger in a strange land. Viola has next to nothing in the sense that the network of social relationships in which she has, up to now, been supported,

has been radically effaced, wiped out, literally drowned in the ocean. The ship's captain thinks her brother might still be alive, but there is not really much hope. But Viola, though she is alone, is not completely bereft of resources. She has some money. She is sturdy, resilient, probably a good swimmer, and she demonstrates alacrity in coping with very difficult situations. She is able to act on her own behalf when she has no alternative. When you've just survived a shipwreck, "if I am not for myself, then who will be for me?" is not an academic question.

In addition to her gold, Viola has an improvisatory competence, a basic package of verbal skills that enable her to speak in "many sorts of music" (1.2.54). To cash this in she decides it would be best to apply to Duke Orsino, disguising herself as a "eunuch" whose skills in the various arts of giving pleasure may be "very worth his service" (55). Viola has to take a chance here and she decides that the Captain is someone she can trust. In fact, he is her only chance. Basically, she is going to give him her clothes for safe-keeping; or, in other words, she is going to trust him with the secret of her sex. She asks him if he will "Shape thou thy silence to my wit" (57). The captain agrees: "Be you his eunuch, and your mute I'll be; When my tongue blabs, then let mine eyes not see" (58–59). Your secret, he says, is safe with me. Both eunuchs and mutes are physically incomplete or compromised men whose task is to guard female chastity. And this language speaks both to Viola's empowerment and her disempowerment. She is going to be the guardian of her own chastity by becoming a eunuch. She bets on her own assets as the guarantee of her survival and her personal integrity. She loses the bet not because her chastity is compromised, but because she becomes trapped by her own versatility. "Disguise I see thou art a wickedness wherein the pregnant enemy does much" (2.2.25–26).

Viola has the very bad luck to fall in love with her master, Duke Orsino. She has even worse luck when the Duchess Olivia, to whom she has been sent to woo on behalf of Orsino, falls in love with her, thinking Viola is really a young man.<sup>43</sup> Her disguise as a young man is so good, in fact, that she gets embroiled in a duel over the affections of the Duchess. The whole thing looks like an implausible farce, but in *Twelfth Night*, as in many of Shakespeare's other comedies, something more is at stake than the elaboration of a conventional dramatic formula. Viola's predicament represents a problem of moral orientation.<sup>44</sup> She would like to express her feelings directly to Orsino, but he thinks she is really a boy whose feelings are not to be taken seriously. Viola resorts to something a bit like Rosalind's self-impersonation, saying

what she feels by not saying it, by telling the history of a sister she doesn't really have.

*Viola:* . . . She never told her love,  
But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud,  
Feed on her damask cheek: she pined in thought,  
And with a green and yellow melancholy  
She sat like patience on a monument,  
Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed?

(2.5.109–14)

Mourning for her lost brother, she becomes her brother, and seems condemned either to lead a completely false and absurd life of unrequited love or to be exposed as an imposter. When the Duke asks if the sister died of her love she tells him the truth:

I am all the daughters of my father's house,  
And all the brothers too: and yet I know not.

(2.5.119–21)

She doesn't know if "her sister" died of love, because she doesn't know how her own story will end.

"If not now, when?" Viola's predicament here, and throughout *Twelfth Night*, represents the pathos of solitude as a deferral of recognition. To guard her chastity, to maintain her integrity as Viola, she has to make herself vanish. Feste has promised Orsino that "Journey's end in lovers meeting" but that doesn't quite happen. Viola and Sebastian recognize each other, but it's not clear if they embrace.

Do not embrace me till each circumstance  
Of place, time, fortune, do cohere and jump  
That I am Viola.

(5.1.244–46)

Yu Jin Ko describes a performance where they do not and she relates this to the moment in John 20:17 when Jesus says to Mary Magdalene, "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to the Father." The joy of reconciliation is deferred here until Viola's absent self can be brought back into view. The pain of deferral suggests that there is "no promise of transcendent fulfillment."<sup>45</sup>

All that has to happen now is for the Captain to re-appear and confirm Viola's identity by producing discarded clothing. But this is what really happens in the story:

The captain that did bring me first on shore  
 Hath my maid's garments. He upon some action  
 Is now in durance, at Malvolio's suit,  
 A gentleman and follower of my lady's.

(5.1.267–70)

Somewhere, we don't know the exact location, the "real Viola" or at least her maid's garments, are held in trust by the Captain. The relationship between Viola and the Captain is a bargain between wit and silence, between being the "versatile" object of desire Viola has to become in order to survive and the lost self indefinitely held "in durance." Viola's own garments are going to be produced tomorrow—but not now. Then she will become "Orsino's mistress and his fancy's Queen." Is this going to be the "when" of self-reconciliation or just a different kind of durance? When is the self present? Hillel has an answer for this: "Appear neither naked nor clothed, neither sitting nor standing, neither laughing nor weeping."

### **What's in the brain that ink may character Which hath not figured to thee my true spirit.**

Used as a verb, character means to engrave or to write. This really is a *literal* usage of the word, since it refers to the idea of written marks or letters of the alphabet.<sup>46</sup> Sonnet 108 asks how ink can be used to display what's in the brain, which otherwise cannot be seen. The answer is not only that ink can represent the mind; it can even represent the "true spirit," the breath of life or essence of a person. The sonnets are deeply preoccupied with writing, and with ink as an expressive medium; a black substance that, paradoxically, can illuminate what's dark. Ink is black, like the black bile associated with melancholia; and indeed the whole enterprise of the sonnets represents the pathology of writing.<sup>47</sup> This sonnet suggests that "mind" can be exhaustively represented in writing, not because the poet has anything new to say, but because the love that motivates the verse can somehow bring dead metaphors back to life: ". . . eternal love in love's fresh case / Weighs not the dust and injury of age."

Shakespeare uses character as a verb several times in his plays, usually in reference to things that can be written into the mind. When Polonius wants Laertes to follow his fatherly advice, even when he's away in Paris, he tells him "these few precepts in thy memory see thou character" (*Hamlet*, 1.3.58–59). The precepts have to be written down, characterized, so that Laertes won't forget them. In *Two Gentlemen of Verona* Julia wants "advice" about how she can undertake a journey to see "my loving Proteus":

*Julia:* Counsel, Lucetta; gentle girl, assist me;  
And even in kind love I do conjure thee,  
Who art the table wherein all my thoughts  
Are visibly character'd and engraved.

(*Two Gentlemen of Verona*: 2.7.1–4)

The basis for this odd request is that Lucetta knows all Julia's thoughts, which she has confided or "visibly character'd," as if to say "you are the person who knows me best." The idea of trust here is figured as an act of writing thoughts in another person's mind. Lucetta's counsel is sensible and prudent: "don't do it." Julia's response is "hinder not my course" (33). She doesn't want advice. She wants a strategy which will take the form of "weeds as may beseem some well-reputed page" (42–43).

These examples suggest that writing down thoughts and precepts from another person in your mind should promote rational behavior. But Hamlet, after seeing the Ghost, wants to *erase* everything he's learned so that "thy commandment all alone shall live / Within the book and volume of my brain" (1.5.102–3). The idea of the mind as a commonplace book, full of trivial records and maxims collected from books, doesn't correspond to a genuine self capable of acting authentically. Hamlet wants only one thing to be written in his mind:—his father's commandment. But it's not really clear that this will lead to a sensible course of action.

Polonius wants to give his son maxims designed to help him live a good life and so he tells him to "character" his father's precepts so that they will be part of the son's identity. Hamlet wants to erase everything he knows so that he can follow his father's writ. But there are things that can be written in the mind that don't help with living a good life and that can't be erased either. Lady Macbeth is "troubled with thick coming fancies, / That keep her from her rest" (5.3.40–41) Macbeth thinks her doctor should be able to do something about it:

*Macbeth:* Cure her of that.  
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,

Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,  
 Raze out the written troubles of the brain  
 And with some sweet oblivious antidote  
 Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff  
 Which weighs upon the heart?

(5.3.42–47)

This is an extraordinary insight into the way the mind works. Lady Macbeth's sleeplessness, her obsessive fantasies, her delusions, are not caused by an excess of black bile or by any "chemical imbalance."<sup>48</sup> Macbeth knows that his wife's suffering is caused by something in her memory and that she lacks the capacity or the will to "an active forgetfulness . . . preserving mental order, calm, and decorum."<sup>49</sup>

If psychoanalysis is what Macbeth has in mind as the remedy for Lady Macbeth's illness, he is bound to be disappointed. The Doctor tells him, "Therein the patient must minister to himself" (5.3.47–48). Why does he say "himself" when the person they're talking about is Lady Macbeth? The Doctor understands what's really going on and he knows that the Queen is not the only one who exhibits symptoms of serious mental illness. He also knows the signs of a bad conscience, but as a physician he also understands that there are times when it's best to be discrete. He does, however, manage to give Macbeth some therapeutic advice, if only obliquely. The patient must "minister to himself" through confession and contrition of heart. It won't "raze out the written troubles" (5.3.44), but it might make you feel better about them. Macbeth isn't much interested in heeding the Doctor's advice, any more than Julia is in heeding Lucetta's. He does what men often do when they're depressed and anxious: he decides that action is the best remedy.

The "written troubles" in Lady Macbeth's brain clearly have something to do with her remorse over killing Duncan. But there might have been other things written there that made her want to do such a deed in the first place. And what about Macbeth? Did he kill Duncan because he wanted to be king? Or was wanting to be king simply an excuse for killing? There is reason to think that Macbeth didn't really want to kill Duncan at all and that he acted against his own best judgment in carrying out the murder. What's in the brain can be "charactered"—expressly written out as the record of someone's "true spirit." Even so, other people are hard to understand; everyone has "written troubles" of their own.

Like Macbeth, Angelo in *Measure for Measure* is a man much admired for his virtues. Also like Macbeth, his exemplary behavior is rewarded

with trust, authority, and status. When the Duke appoints him Deputy, with full power to govern the city of Vienna, this is how he explains his decision:

*Duke:* There is a kind of character in thy life,  
That to th'observer doth thy history  
Fully unfold. Thyself and thy belongings  
Are not thine own so proper as to waste  
Thyself upon thy virtues, they on thee.

(*Measure for Measure* 1.1.28–31)

What does the Duke mean by telling Angelo “there is . . . a character in thy life”? At face value, the phrase means that what’s written down—“a character”—in Angelo’s life makes his history explicit—“unfolds it fully”—to the observer. Angelo’s “character” then, is somehow transparent, and that is why he has earned the Duke’s confidence. But then why does the Duke go to such lengths to caution Angelo that his virtues are not his exclusive possession? In the OED, this passage is cited for the usage of “character” to mean “a cipher for secret correspondence.” Maybe the Duke is saying there is a secret code in your life that makes your history explicit, if we can find a way to decipher you. But what are the “written troubles” in Angelo’s brain that would account for his creepy assault on Isabella? Does a virtuous man suddenly decide to act on his fantasies of domination and rape just because he can? It’s possible that Angelo really believes in his virtue, but acts against his own all-things-considered best judgment. His actions in this sense are incontinent. Like Ovid’s Medea, Angelo thinks, “Against my own wishes, some strange influence weighs heavily upon me, and desire sways me one way, reason another. I see which is the better course, and I approve it: but still I follow the worse” (*Metamorphoses*: 7.13–23). Or should we consider Angelo’s caddish behavior towards Marianna, along with his extortion and subsequent betrayal of Isabella, as compelling evidence that he is just vicious to the core? One doesn’t care to think of what was done in that darkened bedroom.

“Who will believe my verse in times to come?” In Sonnet 17 Shakespeare wonders about the skepticism of future readers, who may not believe in what he has written, in the way he has characterized the beauty of his beloved young man. “The age to come will say ‘this poet lies.’” Well, maybe not lying, just exaggerating. People often do when they think about their loved ones. The French Princess Constance in *King John*, for example, thinks Prince Arthur, her son, the most “gracious creature

born” since Abel. And when he is captured by the English, her sorrow is extravagant. Constance’s mind is not so much a written document as it is a theatrical *mise-en-scène* in which grief plays the principal role:

*Constance:* Grief fills the room up of my absent child,  
Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me,  
Puts on his pretty looks, repeats his words,  
Remembers me of all his gracious parts,  
Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form;  
Then, have I reason to be fond of grief?

(*King John* 3.4.93–98)

In a way, this can be made to appear disingenuous. Constance has a political interest in her son’s dynastic entitlement that she expressed earlier as grievance and complaint. It doesn’t require much historical inquiry to realize that she is politically ambitious and calculating. Even so, notwithstanding the histrionics, I think this verse expresses how grief acts in the mind and why a person would be fond of it. I don’t need historical evidence or a biographical correlative to be affected by this. The loss of a child is part of the story. For me to understand what’s happened to a character in a fiction I really need to face up to what can happen to a real person.

Constance is not the central figure in *King John*. She appears in only a few scenes and she plays no significant role in the great military conflict between England and France. When King Philip tells her she is “fond of grief” his admonition may not be meant unkindly. To be “fond” of grief is, in a sense, to be infatuated, foolish, and even a bit crazy. Cardinal Pandulph’s charge is less tender: “you hold too heinous a respect of grief” (3.4.90). A conscientious historical inquiry could help explain the tradition of Christian Stoicism behind the Cardinal’s statement and the sense that Constance’s love for her child is excessive, or even sinful. Another line of historical inquiry could explain that a noblewoman like Constance is expected to maintain her dignity even in these dire circumstances. But what is any of this to Constance—or to me—at this moment? “He talks to me that never had a son” (3.4.91). Constance recognizes and rejects the shabby explanations of the men in power who can always find ways to make brutality appear reasonable. As for me, I think I’m supposed to bear witness to Constance’s suffering, not to try and explain it away.

Constance’s refusal to be silenced or intimidated is *intended* to explode complacency. It is a direct challenge both to the make-believe Cardinal

Pandulph in *King John* and to the real Cardinal Pandulph in every one of us. It happens again when Shylock asks Antonio's friends "hath not a Jew eyes" and again when Lady Macduff confronts the lame excuses offered by Ross to "justify" her husband's abandonment of his wife and children: "All is the fear and nothing is the love" (4.2.12). What's characterized by Shakespeare in this way shows up again and again. His characters are like us, but sometimes they are more courageous than most of us manage to be. They are people who live in a world we can understand. We don't need any specialized historical knowledge to understand Constance or Shylock or Lady Macduff if we are really alive to our own feelings and capable of empathy with other people—the real ones, I mean. Our response to these dramatic moments is underwritten by the shared complexity of our human nature. Engagement with a character has a moral dimension; it corresponds to the imperative of respect for our human vulnerability to loss and grief. We learn about our own complex human nature by thinking about and coming to respect Shakespeare's characters.

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Index 323. 01 Global Corruption 27/11/02 3:15pm Page viii. Contributors. Charles D. Adwan is the executive director and a founding member of the Lebanese Transparency Association, TI's chapter-in-formation in Lebanon. Niyi Alabi has published several books on the media and on parliamentary democracy in West Africa. He consults on media and governance for a number of international organisations. Editor's note. The Global Corruption Report 2003 is Transparency International's second annual report on the state of corruption worldwide. It concentrates on the events and developments that shaped the struggle against corruption from July 2001 to the end of June 2002, the period immediately following that covered by the Global Corruption Report 2001. Contents Foreword by Robert W. Cox ix Acknowledgements xiii Notes on the Contributors xiv List of Abbreviations xvii Part I Theoretical Concepts and Methodological Issues 1 Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton 3 2 The Sociology of Theorising and Neo-Gramscian Perspectives: The Problems of "School" Formation in IPE. European Constitutionalism and Industrial Relations Hans-Jürgen Bieling 93 vii viii Contents 6 Strength Through Unity? viii. Notes on the contributors. Peter Auer holds a Chair in German linguistics at the University of Freiburg, Germany. He has done extensive research on bilingualism and sociolinguistics, on phonology and dialectology, and on interaction and spoken syntax. ix. Notes on contributors. Mark Garner has taught foreign languages, English and applied linguistics at universities in Australia, Britain and Indonesia. His current appointment is at the University of Aberdeen, UK. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. The editors would like to thank their colleagues at the Universities of Nottingham and Aberdeen for support and practical help and advice: Svenja Adolphs, Ron Carter, Kathy Conklin, Zoltan Dornyei, Mark Garner, Sarah Grandage, John McRae, Norbert Schmitt, and Violeta Sotirova. Notes on the contributors. Lennart Aqvist has been a Docent of Practical Philosophy since 1960 when he received his Ph. D. from the University of Uppsala. He has also taught at the University of Lund and at Abo Academy, and been a Visiting Professor at Brown University and the University of Stuttgart. Aqvist's areas of research include philosophical logic, philosophy of language, ethics, philosophy of law and epistemology. Among his publications are *A New Approach to the Logical Theory of Interrogatives*, Tiibingen 1975; *Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems*, Nap This collaboration "involving over 30 editors, contributors, and readers scattered across the United States and beyond" would not have been possible without them (Harris, Miles, Paine ix). Here and elsewhere, the world in acknowledgments is the world of "ewe," composed of multiple partners who all contribute to something beyond the single-author self. goes on there (ix-x). The community of writers at the University of Pittsburgh constitutes what Shipka calls a "broader flow" that affects Harris's orientation to teaching. He notes that both "declare a relationship between the author and other actors on the academic stage," but acknowledgments are "a voluntary act of reciprocation" (25).

Note on contributors. Acknowledgements. Introduction. Part I: Export diversification, SMEs and new market opportunities. 1: Export diversification and economic growth: the case of Mauritius. Contents. Foreword by the WTO Director-General vii Note on the WTO Chairs Programme ix Note on contributors xi Acknowledgements xv. Introduction 1 Marion Jansen, Mustapha Sadni Jallab and Maarten Smeets. Section I. Export diversification, SMEs and new market opportunities. vii. viii. Connecting to global markets. dynamic segments of global markets. Notes on contributors. xiii. Ahmadou Aly Mbaye Dean, School of Economics and Management, Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar Fann, Senegal. Acknowledgments. Table of contents. Foreword. SECTION VIII: RECONCILIATION. Reconcile the Account Journal with the Client Ledgers. Enter Bank Charges and Interest. Also note, if your client's money can earn income in excess of the costs incurred to hold the account, either because the funds are large enough in amount or are held for a long period of time, then you cannot place the funds in an IOLTA account. (See "IOLTA" Accounts and What MUST Be Held in Your IOLTA Account?.) IX. Editors' Note and Acknowledgments. The aim of the present volume is to discuss the notion of constitution from the perspectives of history of political thought. Its scholarly intention is to go beyond the approach concentrating on the formal understanding of constitution and bring forward more complex historical and philosophic-political interpretations. Our point. This paper argues that the writings of Hans Kelsen deserve more attention from those engaged in the debate on secularization and political theology. His lifelong struggle with various forms of legal-political metaphysics is an identifiable thread in many of his writings. Kelsen's concern with the theological-political issues found in the theory of the state (Staatslehre) is far from being [Show full abstract] marginal.